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Abstract
A theory for disturbance decoupling problems has been well developed in the area
ofgeometric control theory. The aimof thepresent study is tointroduce disturbance
decoupling problems in a dynamic gamecontext. For this purpose, techniques from
geometric control theory are applied. Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions are de-
rived for the solvability of the disturbance decoupling problems introduced here.
Consequently, for a given game, the players can easily check if these problems are
solvable or not.
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1 Introduction
Dynamicgametheoryisconcernedwithsituationsinwhichseveralagents(or“play-
ers”)whohavedifferent objectivesareinﬂuencing thesamedynamic system. Often,
the objectives are expressed through cost functions which the agents aim to min-
imize. The usual notion of optimum in the single-agent case is substituted in the
multiple-agent situation by a notion of equilibrium. Actually several such notions
exist, depending on the information that the players have about each other’s deci-
sionsandaboutthesystemstate;forinstance, thereisanessentialdifferencebetween
open-loop and closed-loop equilibria. See [1] for an extensive account.
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In the single-player case, methods of control design are not always linked to cost
functions. Common design objectives such as stability or decoupling in fact do not
give rise to unique optimal controls. Design objectives of this type do not seem to
have received much attention so far in the context of dynamic games. In this paper,
we shall consider a dynamic game version of the well known disturbance decou-
pling problem [3, 5]. With the idea of closed-loop equilibria in mind, we shall con-
sider the situation in which all players use feedback policies. Even given this, there
areseveralsolution concepts toconsiderdepending on whethertheplayers doordo
not cooperate and depending on the information that the players have about each
other’s policies. Speciﬁcally, we shall discuss three cases: (i) the cooperative case;
(ii) the noncooperative case without information about other players’ policies; (iii)
the noncooperative with information about other players’ policies. In each case, we
shall give easily veriﬁable necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a solution to exist.
2 Preliminaries





























































i. In addition, the system is inﬂuenced by the unknown distur-
bance function
d. The output of player
i is given by a linear function
z
















n. In this paper only linear state feedback problems


























































































E is the closed-loop impulse response from distur-
bance to the output of player
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In section 4.2 we use the concept of robust controlled invariance. This concept was
introduced in [2]; a more detailed discussion can be found in [3], section 6.5. In the
following paragraph we recall the deﬁnition and the results that are of importance
for the present paper.
Let
A and




































































). For the computation of this space the following























































































where the value of
k
￿








We ﬁnally present the hyper-robust disturbance localization problem (section 6.5.1






1 depend on the parameter
q. Then,










problem the following result was established [3, Thm.6.5-1].































3 Cooperative Disturbance Decoupling
If the players cooperate it is of common interest to decouple outputs from the dis-
turbance. In the following deﬁnition we deﬁne the problem of decoupling all the
outputs from the disturbance using all the inputs.
Deﬁnition 3.1 TheCooperativeDisturbance DecouplingProblem(CDDP) by statefeed-
back is to ﬁnd feedback maps
F
i such that the system is disturbance decoupled for
all the players.
Disturbance Decoupling in Dynamic Games4 NONCOOPERATIVE DISTURBANCE DECOUPLING 4
In this problem there is neither a distinction between the controls nor between the
outputs. Instead of considering a system with
N controls and
N outputs, we can

































































The standard results from geometric control theory can be applied to this system. If
we apply theorem 2.1 we get the following result.


































4 Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
We now turn to the noncooperative setting. Different problems can be posed de-
pending on whether or not players choose their feedback policies in a certain or-
der and are aware of each other’s decisions. In this section we shall ﬁx one player
(denoted by subscript d) and consider the situations in which this player is or is not
aware of the other players’ chosen feedback policies. For ease of notation we take
N
=
2 ; the second player will be denoted by subscript o.
4.1 Strong Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
Here we consider the situation without information about other players’ choices of
feedback policies. The corresponding problem can be formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The Strong Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling Problem (SNDDP)
by state feedback is to ﬁnd a feedback map
F
d such that the system is disturbance







































































Obviously, this condition (which is stated completely in terms of the system matri-
ces) is a necessary condition for solvability of the SNDDP by state feedback. In the
following lemma we prove another consequence of (1).
Lemma 4.2 If there exists an
F












































































































































































































































































































0 , which is the desired result.
￿
So the feedback maaping
F
d that solves the SNDDP by state feedback also satisﬁes

























Again we ﬁnd a necessary condition for the solvability of the SNDDP by state feed-
backcompletelyintermsofthesystemmatrices. In thefollowing theoremitisstated
that (2) and (3) are also sufﬁcient.
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Proof The necessity was already proven. For the sufﬁciency, it sufﬁces to consider


































































Together with (4) shows that the closed loop system is disturbance decoupled for
player d.
￿
Formula (4) provides a compact necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence
ofafeedbackcontrolforthedecoupling playerthatachievesdisturbancedecoupling
for him whatever the other player will do. In fact, if condition (4) holds, the cor-
responding feedback control of the decoupling player achieves disturbance decou-
pling for any control of the other player.
4.2 Weak Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
In this subsection we consider the case in which information about other players’
feedback policies is available. The corresponding problem can be formally deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.4 TheWeakNoncooperativeDisturbanceDecouplingProblem(WNDDP)by
state feedback is to ﬁnd for any given feedback map
F
o a feedback map
F
d such that
the system is disturbance decoupled for player d.
IftheWNDDP bystatefeedbackis solvable,thedecoupling playerisabletorespond
toany control ofthe otherplayer in such awaythat hecan decouple his output from




0 , the decoupling



























































o is not manipulable for the decoupling player, it is accessible for his de-
coupling purposes. We recognize this problem as a particular case of the hyper-ro-
bust disturbance localization problem (see the end of section 2). According to Theo-
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d (we write a dot instead of an
F
o in order to indicate that the robust-
nessneedstobeinterpretedwithrespecttothis parameter). According toAlgorithm
































































































































































































We have now shown that solvability of the WNDDP by state feedback implies (5)
and (7). The latter condition is however not yet in terms of the system matrices. We
will remedy this after the following lemma.






















































Remark The last term of the sequence
V




















































































































1, which completes the proof.
￿













i and by taking the
lasttermin thissequence (as notedin thepreceding remark)wearriveatanecessary
condition in terms of the system matrices. In the following theorem we claim that
this condition together with condition (5) is actually also sufﬁcient for solvability of
WNDDP.
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Formula (8) and (9) provide compact necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the de-
coupling player to respond to the action of the other player always in such a way
that his output is decoupled from the disturbance.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of the paper was to deﬁne some disturbance decoupling problems in the
area of differential games. Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the solvability of
these problems in terms of the system datawerederived; consequently, one can eas-
ily verify whether the considered problems are solvable for a given system.
The idea of considering games in which the players follow certain control objectives
that are not necessarily given by cost functions can be carried further in many ways.
In the context of decoupling, extensions can for instance be made in the direction of
incorporating stability and to the case where the players are not able to completely
observe the state and/or each other’s actions. The notion of equilibrium could be
incorporated to a greater extent by considering games in which the players know
thattheotherplayerswill lookforadecoupling feedbackbutarenotinformedabout
each other’s decisions. The two noncooperative problems considered in this paper
providenecessaryandsufﬁcient conditions respectively foradecoupling solution to
exist in this situation.
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